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COMMENT
MEANING IS IN THE EYE OF THE
BEHOLDER: BMW v. GORE AND ITS
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON TOXIC TORT
ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER
STATE COMMON LAW
Andrew M. Moskowitz*
Sn BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,' the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed a state court decision awarding $4,000 in
compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The
Supreme Court had reviewed punitive damages awards seven times
in the past decade alone,2 but had never overturned one until
BMW.3 The majority opinion in BMW concluded that the $2
million punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted a "grossly excessive"
punishment, and thus reversed the judgment of the Alabama
Supreme Court.4 While the Supreme Court refused to put forth a
bright-line test or mathematical formula for determining the
constitutionality of punitive damages, the BMW opinion does set
forth a three-part test. The test considers the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the ratio between the punitive and
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
2. See Richard C. Reuben, If the Punishment Fits: Doctored BMW Paint Job
Returns Punitive Damages Issue to the Court, ABA J., Nov. 1995, at 54. The Su-
preme Court's most prominent recent decisions rejecting challenges to punitive
damages were TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443
(1993) and Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
3. See Henry J. Reske, Guidelines Instead of Bright Lines: State Rulings on
Punitives Unlikely to be Uniform Despite High Court Guidance, ABA J., July
1996, at 36 (noting that the ruling is "the first time in a decade of punitive dam-
ages cases that the justices have said an award is simply too high.").
4. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1589, 1592, 1604.
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compensatory damages, and what civil or criminal penalties exist
for comparable misconduct.'
BMW involved Dr. Ira Gore, Jr.'s purchase of an apparently new
BMW for $40,750.88. Gore later discovered that the car had been
partially refinished prior to sale.6 Acid rain had damaged the car's
paint finish, but because the cost of the repairs to Gore's auto-
mobile ($601.37) was less than three percent of $40,750.88, BMW
did not inform Gore or the dealer that BMW had refinished it.7
Nine months after purchasing the car, Gore brought it to a detailer
and learned that his car had previously been refinished!8 As a
result, he sued BMW for fraud.9 The jury found in favor of Gore,
determining that the damage to the car had devalued it by
$4,000.0 In addition, the jury found clear and convincing evidence
that BMW "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression,
fraud, wantonness or malice with regard to [Gore,]"" returning a
punitive damages award of $4 million. 2 On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court partially modified this holding. It held that the jury
could not consider acts in other jurisdictions because no evidence
existed that the conduct in other states was wrongful. 3 The court
reduced the jury's award and held that a constitutionally reasonable
punitive damages award was $2,000,000."4 Of course, this punitive
5. Id. at 1599-03.
6. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 621 (Ala.
1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 621.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 621-22.
11. Id. at 622.
12. Id. at 627. The jury calculated this figure by multiplying $4,000 times the
approximate number of vehicles BMW had sold nationwide without disclosing
that it had performed repair work. The number of cars that BMW had allegedly
refinished was 983, not 1,000, but the jury apparently rounded up. Id. at 623.
13. Id. at 627. The court noted that the only evidence on this issue reflected
that "approximately 60% of the vehicles that were refinished were sold in states
where failure to disclose the repair was not an unfair trade practice." Id. at 627
n.6. BMW sold an estimated 11 to 14 refinished cars in Alabama. Id.
14. Id. at 629. One cannot be sure how the Alabama Supreme Court arrived at
this figure. Using the trial court jury's formula, the figure should have been at
most $56,000 (i.e. 14 times $4,000).
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damages award was still 500 times greater than the compensatory
damages Gore received. Less than two years after the Alabama
Supreme Court handed down its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 5
This Comment will attempt to discern whether BMW sets a new
federal standard for the review of punitive damages awards, and
will focus in particular on toxic tort actions brought under state
common law. Such actions have become increasingly common
because they are generally easier to bring and afford greater relief
than statutory actions. 16 Thus, the BMW decision may have an
impact on whether, and in what amounts, courts in such cases
award punitive damages.
Part I will examine the context of the decision and the Supreme
Court's position on punitive damages prior to BMW. In addition, it
will examine the punitive damages debate and the increasing
importance of common-law tort actions in environmental law. Part
II will examine the Supreme Court's decision and opinions in
BMW. Part III will examine the decision's implications for general
tort litigation and environmental law, focusing on how courts have
applied BMW's three-part test and how each part might affect
common-law toxic tort actions. The Comment concludes that (1)
the aspect of the BMW test a court chooses to emphasize will
determine whether it limits or reduces punitive damages awards;
and (2) the BMW decision's guidelines will not establish a uniform
federal standard for the review of punitive damage awards.
I. THE DECISION'S CONTEXT
A. The Intersection of Environmental Law and Common-law Tort
Actions
As one author has noted, "[c]ommon-law theories of recovery in
environmental impairment cases have made a strong comeback in
the 1990s."' 7 While environmental practitioners had previously
relied on federal statutory causes of action in the 1970s and 1980s,
15. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
16. See generally Randall G. Vickery & Robert M. Baratta Jr., Back to the
Legal Future, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1996, at Cl.
17. Id.
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they are now bringing state common law actions under theories of
negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability.'8 Several reasons
exist for this phenomenon. First, many environmental laws do not
contain "citizen suit" provisions, while Others only permit suits for
injunctive relief.' In addition, some statutes like the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"),0 do permit citizen suits, but limit recovery to
the cost of cleanup' and do not provide for "personal-injury dam-
ages, stigma damages, consequential damages and punitive damag-
9,22
es ....
Common-law actions are also less onerous to maintain. For ex-
ample, under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 ("RCRA"), 3 one must establish the existence of "imminent
and substantial endangerment" to commence a RCRA-based civil
action.2 ' Finally, environmental statutes often do not cover all en-
vironmental torts. For example, CERCLA does not define petro-
leum as a hazardous substance. Thus, "a plaintiff may not be able
to maintain a cost recovery claim successfully based on CERCLA
for the cleanup of petroleum contamination. ' '25
A recent case indicates the increasing importance of punitive
damages in state-law toxic tort actions. In Houchens v. Rockwell In-
ternational Group, fifty-two owners of riparian properties sued
Rockwell International Corporation ("Rockwell") in Kentucky state
court for polluting a river.2 6 Because of contamination, the state
banned swimming and fishing in the river.27 The plaintiffs claimed
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994) (permitting recovery for "costs of removal
or remedial action," damages to "natural resources" and other incidental costs).
22. See Vickery & Baratta, supra note 16, at CI.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1994).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). See also Vickery & Baratta, supra note 16, at
C1.
25. Vickery & Baratta, supra note 16, at Cl.
26. No. 93-158 (Ky. Cir. Ct. verdict May 31, 1996); see Kentucky Property
Owners Awarded $218 Million, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 419 (June 7, 1996).
27. See Verdicts and Settlements: $217.7M Awarded Against Rockwell for
PCB Runoff, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at A15.
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that the river contamination had diminished their property value and
caused a loss of fishing and hunting rights,28 and pled "nuisance,
trespass ... and loss of use and enjoyment .. .."" They also al-
leged that the defendant had lied to the public and to state regula-
tors and altered test results to cover up the extent of the contamina-
tion."
The jury's verdict, issued eleven days after the BMW opinion,
awarded the plaintiffs $210 million in punitive damages and $8
million in compensatory damages, a ratio of over twenty-six to
one.31 Rockwell has promised to appeal, and surely the case's fact
pattern will reappear in future cases - environmental contamina-
tion that results in diminished property values and loss of use and
enjoyment. How the BMW decision will impact on Rockwell-type
verdicts remains an open question.
B. TXO: The Supreme Court's Previous Standard for the Review
of Punitive Damages Awards
Prior to its BMW holding, the Supreme Court's last major deci-
sion reviewing a punitive damages award was TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp..32 Unlike in BMW, the Court in
TXO rejected this challenge to a state court's punitive damages
award.33 In TXO, Alliance controlled the rights to a tract of land,
and TXO sought to obtain the rights to develop the land's oil and
gas resources.34 TXO made Alliance an offer, and Alliance agreed
to assign its interest in the land to TXO.35 However, Alliance also
agreed to return any consideration TXO paid to it if TXO's attor-
28. See Kentucky Property Owners Awarded $218 Million, supra note 26, at
419.
29. Kentucky Jury Levies $210M Punitive Damage Award Against Rockwell,
Toxic Chem. Litig. Rep., June 18, 1996, at-23,272.
30. See Verdicts and Settlements: $217.7M Awarded Against Rockwell for
PCB Runoff, supra note 27, at A15.
31. See Kentucky Property Owners Awarded $218 Million, supra note 26, at
419.
32. 509 U.S. 443, 443 (1993).
33. Id. at 456.
34. Id. at 447.
35. Id.
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ney determined that the title was defective.3 6 TXO then tried sev-
eral methods to cast doubt on the title's validity in order to reduce
its royalty payments to Alliance. These acts included an attempt to
coerce someone to execute a false affidavit and to institute a know-
ingly false declaratory judgment action. 7
In a few important respects, TXO's facts mirror BMW's. First, the
punitive damages award was 526 times the size of the compensa-
tory damages, and thus was even more disproportionate than that in
BMW.38 In addition, the petitioner also contended that the verdict
violated its substantive due process rights, and thus "must be
deemed an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of
law."39 Furthermore, Justice Stevens, .who delivered the BMW
opinion, also announced the judgment of the Court in TXO.'
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in TXO refused to formulate a
mathematical test or so-called bright-line for determining when a
punitive damages award is excessive.4' Rather, it put forth a case-
by-case analysis that considered actual harm and potential harm
that "the defendant's conduct would have caused.., if the wrong-
ful plan had succeeded .... "42 Thus, while in TXO the jury found
that actual damages were $19,000 but awarded $10 million in puni-
tive damages,43 the plurality noted that the defendant's conduct
could have caused millions of dollars in damages to other vic-
tims." The defendant's actions were "part of a larger pattern of
fraud, trickery and deceit," and due to the defendant's wealth, the
opinion concluded that the punitive damages award was not "gross-
36. Id. at 447-48.
37. Id. at 448-49.
38. Id. at 453.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 446. Unlike the opinion in BMW, which was a majority, the TXO
opinion was a plurality. Id.
41. See id. at 458. The BMW decision also declined to put forth a bright line
test. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1602 ("we have
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
mathematical formula .... It is appropriate, therefore, to reiterate our rejection of
a categorical approach.").
42. TXO, 509 U.S. at 460.
43. Id. at 446.
44. Id. at 462.
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ly excessive."'45
Quite significantly, however, the plurality rejected an argument
that the majority in BMW would later adopt. In TXO, the plurality
rejected the defendant's argument that it did not have notice that its
conduct would warrant such a huge punitive damages penalty.'
Rather, the Court concluded that the "notice component of the Due
Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a pu-
nitive damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously
tortious conduct." 47
Justice Kennedy concurred, in part, with the plurality opinion and
concurred in the Court's judgment. While emphasizing that a puni-
tive damages award reflecting jury "bias, passion, or prejudice" is
unconstitutional "no matter what the absolute or relative size of the
award,"' his concurrence stated that the defendant's pattern of
fraud and coercion justified the award.49 Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment but refused to adopt the
plurality's case-by-case balancing test.5" Justices Scalia and Thom-
as stated that federal courts have no constitutional role in this area
except to assure that traditional safeguards have been observed."
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice White
joined in full and Justice Souter joined in part. 2 The dissent's
premise was that "neither this award's size nor the procedures that
produced it" were consistent with prior Supreme Court prece-
dent.53 Justice O'Connor's dissent noted that the "potential harm"
theory was not even part of the jury instructions, and thus "that
theory can neither explain nor justify the otherwise astonishing
verdict the jury returned."54 Furthermore, the dissent contended
that the state court did not sufficiently guard against the risk of
45. Id.
46. Id. at 463.
47. Id. at 465-66.
48. Id. at 467.
49. Id. at 469.
50. Id. at 470.
51. Id. This position is nearly identical to their dissent in BMW. See Part II.C,
infra.
52. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 472 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 473.
54. Id. at 486.
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prejudice since TXO was a large, out-of-state corporation.5 Final-
ly, the dissent found that the state Supreme Court of Appeals re-
view was "cavalier" and that "the case at least should be remanded
for constitutionally adequate post-verdict review."56
C. The Current Supreme Court: Its Makeup and Disposition
A few of the Supreme Court Justices who heard BMW were
different from those who heard earlier challenges to punitive dam-
ages awards.57 While Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined three deci-
sions rejecting such challenges,58 Justice Stephen G. Breyer has
displayed a more "pro-business leaning[]."59 Indeed, Justice Breyer
sided with the majority in BMW, writing a concurring opinion.'" In
addition, the Court has recently displayed a broad sympathy for so-
called states' rights issues,6 and has accepted for the 1996-97
term a suit challenging federal gun control legislation.62
55. Id. at 492-93.
56. Id. at 496.
57. Since TXO, Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg have
replaced Justices Harry A. Blackmun and Byron White.
58. See Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(rejecting argument that $6 million punitive damages award violated the exces-
sive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. I (upholding $840,000 punitive damages award); TXO, 509 U.S.
at 443.
59. Reuben, supra note 2, at 54.
60. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring).
61. One law professor noted before the BMW verdict that "[tihe anti-federalist
sentiment on the Court appears to be growing and could provide a subtext for
any number of cases before the Court, including punitive damages .... ." Reuben,
supra note 2, at 54.
62. See Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996). See also Linda
Greenhouse, States' Power Among Hard Issues on Supreme Court's New Agenda,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at Al.
Not surprisingly, both sides in the BMW debate attempted to seize the
states' rights argument as their own. BMW contended that punishing a defendant
for alleged injuries in other states was unconstitutional, while Gore argued that
the award was an appropriate way of protecting Alabama's citizens and forcing
BMW to change its policy. Reuben, supra note 2, at 54.
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D. The Punitive Damages Debate
As Justice Ginsburg indicated in her BMW dissent, many states
have recently moved to limit punitive damages awards.63 In total,
sixteen states have or are contemplating caps on punitive damages
awards,64 and an additional twenty-six have examined or enacted
some type of tort reform legislation.' Indeed, "[iln 1995 alone,
nine state legislatures enacted tort reform legislation addressing
punitive damages."'
Thus, trial lawyers and their lobbyists argue that additional, judi-
cially-imposed tort reform is unnecessary, and verdicts similar to
BMW, where the punitive damages were 500 times larger than the
compensatory damages, are the exception in a rational judicial
system.67 Evidence that supports this argument includes one recent
study that examined verdicts in forty-five of the nation's seventy-
63. See infra.
64. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1618-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Many states
are attempting to keep punitive damages proportionate to compensatory damages.
For example, a New Jersey law would, in some tort cases, cap punitive damages
at $350,000 or five times compensatory damages, whichever is greater. See N.J.
S. 1496, 206th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (1995). Other states tailor the award to the
wealth of the defendant. For example Kansas caps punitive damages at the lesser
of defendant's annual gross income or $5 million. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-
3701 (e), (f) (1994). Finally, at least one state has a cap on all punitive damage
awards. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (capping punitive dam-
age awards at $350,000).
65. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1619-20. Some states require that a percentage of the
award go to the state treasury. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994)
(allocating 50% of punitive damage awards in medical malpractice cases to the
state treasury); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (apportioning 50% of
punitive damages awards greater than $20,000 to the state treasury). Others re-
quire that a certain percentage go to a "victims"' fund. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.675 (1994) (earmarking 50% of punitive damages, after expenses and pay-
ment of counsel fees, to the "Tort Victims' Compensation Fund").
66. Marshall S. Turner & Andrew T. Houghton, Punitive Damages Reform
Moves to the State Arena, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B7.
67. For example, in the aftermath of the BMW verdict Pamela A. Liapakis,
President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, said that punitive damage
awards "are rare and modest" and that companies "seeking tort reform do not
want to be held accountable for wrongdoing." Andrew Blum, Study Finds
Punitives Are Small, Rare, NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1996, at A6.
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five most populous counties.' It found that plaintiffs received pu-
nitive damage awards in only six percent of cases.69 In addition, of
the 2,849 trials that plaintiffs won, the "mean compensatory damag-
es award ... [was] $386,000; in those cases, 177 punitive awards
also were meted out, with a mean of $534,000. "7o Thus, in the
average case, unlike BMW's immensely disproportionate ratio,
punitive damages are only slightly larger than the compensatory
damages awarded. However, the study also noted that a large dis-
parity exists among the states. While successful plaintiffs might re-
ceive punitive damages in only six percent of cases nationwide,
those who win trials in the Atlanta and Dallas area courts have a
twenty percent chance of receiving punitive damages."
Many have called for national tort reform legislation.72 In 1996,
Congress approved a bill that would have limited most punitive
damage claims in product liability actions to the greater of
$250,000 or two times the compensatory damages.73 However, in
May 1996, President Clinton vetoed the bill, and specifically cited
as one of his reasons his opposition to "arbitrary ceilings on puni-
tive damages ....
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Dick Thornburgh, Guest Commentary: The High Court's Gore v.
BMW Decision Leaves Businesses Without Risk-Assessment Guidelines and Judg-
es with More Work Thornburgh Says, PENN. L. WKLY., Aug. 5, 1996, at 4. The
article stated that the lack of uniformity in the states' treatment of punitive dam-
ages creates "a crazy quilt of requirements that subject businesses to a high de-
gree of uncertainty as to potential civil liability .... The [tort reform legislation
that President Clinton vetoed] would have set a uniform standard . . . ." Id.
73. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(B) (1996). See also T.R. Goldman,
What's Next for Punitive Damages?, LEGAL TImES, May 27, 1996, at 13.
74. Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1996 - Veto Message
from the President of the United States, 142 CONG. REc. H4425 (Daily Ed. May
6, 1996). Whether punitive damages caps would affect even some of the larger
verdicts is unclear. For example, a recent verdict against General Motors awarded
the plaintiff $150 million in damages. Fifty million dollars were compensatory
damages, while $100 million were punitive damages. The legislation that Presi-
dent Clinton vetoed would have permitted such a verdict, since it was two times
the compensatory damages. See Turner & Houghton, supra note 66, at B7. In
addition, whether caps on damages are constitutional is still, at least in some
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II. THE BMW DECISION: THE THREE-PART TEST AND THE
EFFECT OF STATE LAW ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
A. The Majority Opinion
1. BMW's Three-Part Test
As Justice Scalia's dissent observed, the most significant aspect
of the BMW decision "[was] the identification of a 'substantive due
process' right against a 'grossly excessive' [damages] award."75
While previous rulings had addressed such procedural aspects as
jury instructions, the majority in BMW addressed the substantive
rights of a defendant.76 Specifically, the opinion held that when an
award "enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness [then it] violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 77 To identify when
an award enters this "zone," the majority sets forth a three-part test.
a. Degree of Reprehensibility
First, one must consider the degree of reprehensibility of the
offense.7 ' Applying this first factor to BMW's facts, the Court
noted that the harm BMW inflicted on Gore was purely economic
and that the aggravating factors associated with reprehensibility
were not present in the case.79 In contrast, in other cases, the
health and safety of the consumer and the performance of the prod-
uct are implicated."0
jurisdictions, an open question. See James Podgers, Throwing Caps Out of the
Ring: Limits on Personal Injury Damages Are Being Challenged with Mixed
Results, ABA J., Aug. 1996, at 48 (reporting that an Illinois lower court judge
declared that a statutory limit of $500,000 on non-economic damages in all tort
cases was unconstitutional).
75. BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1611 (1996).
76. See Reske, supra note 3, at 36 (noting that BMW is a significant shift
from procedural rights to substantive rights .. .
77. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595.
78. Id. at 1599.
79. Id.
80. Id.
19961
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b. Ratio Between Punitive Award and the Actual Harm Inflicted
Second, the majority opinion stated that a "reasonable relation-
ship" must exist between the punitive damages award and the actu-
al harm inflicted.8 Only three years earlier, Justice Stevens had
upheld a punitive damages award that was 526 times the size of the
plaintiff's compensatory damages, and that opinion purported to
"eschew[] an approach that concentrates entirely on the relationship
between actual and punitive damages.""2 In BMW, however, the
Court attempted to distinguish between actual and potential harm,
and defined the latter as "the harm to the victim that would have
ensued if the tortious plan had succeeded."83 The opinion found no
evidence that Dr. Gore or any other BMW purchaser would have
suffered additional harm due to BMW's nondisclosure policy and
that the disparity in the instant case was "dramatically greater" than
in TXO. 4
c. Legislative Sanctions Provided for Comparable Misconduct
Finally, the majority opinion asserted that a court must compare a
punitive damages award with civil or criminal penalties that a state
may impose for comparable misconduct. In explaining this third
prong, the Court stated that even a large corporation like BMW de-
serves "fair notice."86 Alabama's maximum civil penalty for a de-
ceptive trade practice was $2,000, while other states imposed fines
ranging from $5,000 to $10,000.87 The opinion argued that "[n]one
of these statutes would provide an out-of-state distributor with fair
notice that ... [one or fourteen] violations ... might subject an
offender to a multi-million dollar penalty,"88 and thus concluded
that "the grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends
the constitutional limit."'89
81. Id. at 1601.
82. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460
(1993).
83. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1603.
86. Id. at 1604.
87. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-309(b) (Michie 1992).
88. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
89. Id. at 1604. The Court again, however, refused to "draw a ... bright
BMV v. GORE
2. A New Principle of State Sovereignty
The majority opinion also articulated a state sovereignty principle
that some commentators argue is an equally important legacy of
BMW.' The opinion first described the "patchwork of rules" that
exists among the states regarding the disclosure requirements for re-
pairs to automobiles.9' It stated that while Congress could impose
a national, uniform policy for disclosing these repairs, "no single
State [can] do so .. . ."' Thus, a state such as Alabama cannot
penalize tortfeasors for conduct that is legal in other states.93
Justice Scalia disputed this tenet in his dissent and contended that
a court can increase an award on the basis of a defendant's unlaw-
ful and lawful conduct.94 Yet perhaps more important is what Jus-
tice Stevens' opinion plainly acknowledges - this issue was not
before the Court. Indeed, the opinion conceded that the Alabama
Supreme Court did not consider BMW's out-of-state conduct. 95
Rather, in reducing the trial court's punitive damages award from
$4 million to $2 million, it considered only the "conduct that oc-
curred within Alabama."' Accordingly, one must question whether
this section of the BMW opinion is merely dictum or the new rule
of law in tort cases.97
line." Id. at 1602. This omission should provide courts with latitude in applying
the BMW holding. Of course, lower courts are not free to reject a Supreme Court
holding. However, as many have done. in the aftermath of the BMW decision,
they can conclude that the facts of the case at their bar differ from BMW's. See
infra Part III.
90. See, e.g., Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tager, 'BMW' Limits Punitives,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at B5 (stating that the BMW decision "thus makes
clear that juries may not punish defendants for conduct occurring entirely in other
states, at least insofar as that conduct is not demonstrated to be unlawful in those
other states.").
91. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1596.
92. Id. at 1596-97.
93. Id. at 1597.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1598. See also BMW, 646 So.2d at 627 (stating that evidence of acts
in other states "may not be considered in setting the size of the civil penal-
ty ....")
96. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
97. Many commentators have subsequently treated this principle as binding,
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B. Justice Breyer's Concurrence: Expanding on What Constitutes
"Fair Notice"
Justice Breyer's concurrence conducted an extended and ultimate-
ly fruitless search for a statute or standard giving BMW notice that
its disclosure policy might provoke a $2 million penalty. The con-
currence acknowledged that judgments that are the product of prop-
er procedures deserve a "presumption of validity.""8 However, it
identified a "constitutional concern" when a court imposes punitive
damages on a defendant, and stated that "legal standards" for such
a discretionary exercise must not be "purely arbitrary .... 99
Justice Breyer's concurrence first examined Alabama's punitive
damages statute."'° The statute "pennit[ted] punitive damages in
cases of 'oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.""' ' However,
the concurrence stated that the statute defined these terms too
broadly. The statutory definition of malice, for example, encom-
passed "any 'wrongful act without just cause or excuse,' while
oppression [was] subjecting a person to 'unjust hardship in con-
scious disregard of that person's rights'[.]"" Thus, the concur-
rence complained, a defendant who commits a "most serious" of-
fense such as duping an elderly person and taking all of her money,
as well as a defendant who commits the less serious act of not
telling a wealthy doctor that it repainted his car, can receive puni-
tive damages under this statute.'0 3 Such a statute, the concurrence
concluded, does not impose a significant constraint "against arbi-
trary results."'"
and have begun advising trial lawyers what these new guidelines are. See, e.g.,
Victor E. Schwartz, BMW v. Gore: What Does It Mean for the Future?, PROD-
UcT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, July 1996, at 2 (advising plaintiffs' lawyers "to
be assiduous in separating out the lawful from the unlawful.... If conduct...
[is] lawful in a particular state, the defendant's activity in the state should not be
used to bulk up or obtain punitive damages.").
98. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
99. Id. at 1605.
100. See id. at 1605-06.
101. Id. at 1605 (citing ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993)).
102. Id. (emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at 1605-06.
104. Id. at 1605. This determination is somewhat value-based. The statute
granting the Supreme Court the power to review state court decisions states in
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Next, the concurrence declared that the Alabama Supreme Court
applied its previously-articulated standard for the review of punitive
damages awards "in a way that belies [its stated] purpose."' 5 The
previous standard was set forth in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby"°
and lists seven factors. First, the punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm that has or
might have occurred.0 7 An analysis that finds a reasonable rela-
tionship between $56,000 of "purely economic harm" and $2 mil-
lion in punitive damages, stated the concurrence, "empt[ies] the
'reasonable relationship' test of meaningful content."' ' In exam-
ining the second factor - the degree of reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct - the concurrence reached a similar conclu-
sion, noting that to conclude that BMW's actions were sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant such a large punitive damages award "de-
prive[s] the concept of its constraining power to protect against
serious and capricious deprivations."'"
The third Green Oil factor states that punitive damages should
remove the profit gained from the "illegal activity" and cause a net
loss for the defendant."0 The concurrence noted that while this
factor might have "the ability to limit awards to a fixed, rational
relevant part that such decisions "may be reviewed.., where the validity of
a... [state] statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution ... or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution... ; " 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994). In
this case, Alabama's statute simply provides for punitive damages in a wide
variety of cases. The issue, then, does not concern notice, but rather the
concurrence's judgment that BMW's policy was not as bad as, for example,
duping an elderly person out of her life savings. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605-
06. Justice Ginsburg's dissent offers a similar criticism. See infra notes 129-37
and accompanying text. It notes that "[tihe [majority] decision leads us further
into territory traditionally within the States' domain," and cites the Supreme
Court's own rules which state "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely grant-
ed when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misappli-
cation of a properly stated rule of law . . . ." BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1616-17
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1606.
106. See Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
107. See id. at 223.
108. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1606 (quoting Green Oil Co., 539 So.2d 218).
109. Id.
110. Id. (construing Green Oil Co., 539 So.2d at 223).
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amount," the Alabama Supreme Court did not apply it in such a
manner."' Justice Breyer's analysis acknowledged that the fourth
factor - the defendant's financial position - "is not necessarily
intended" to constrain punitive damages awards, 1 2 and stated that
while relying on this factor is not "unlawful or inappropriate," other
factors must restrain arbitrary awards." 3 Similarly, the fifth factor
- considering litigation costs and encouraging plaintiffs to sue
wrongdoers - "cannot operate as a constraint when an award much
in excess of costs is approved for other reasons."" 4 Finally, the
sixth and seventh factors, whether the defendant suffered criminal
penalty for his conduct, and whether other, similar civil actions had
been filed against the defendant that might serve as a mitigating
factor, did not apply to the BMW case." 5
Justice Breyer's concurrence next considered whether the Ala-
bama Supreme Court relied on any economic theory that might
provide "the constraining legal force" that the Alabama punitive
damages statute and the seven-factor analysis lacked." 6 Such a
theory might use punitive damages awards to "take from the
wrongdoer the total cost of the harm caused.""' 7 The concurrence
concluded that "reference to a constraining 'economic' theory,
which might have counseled more deferential review by this Court,
is lacking in this case."'' 8
The concurrence then searched for a "community understanding
or historic practice" that might constrain "arbitrary behavior and
111. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1606. Again, as observed in note 104, supra, the con-
currence imposes its own values in determining that "arbitrary" results occur. The
third factor does not purport to limit awards; rather, on its face, it seeks to harm
a defendant financially. Nevertheless, the result was not, in its view, "fixed" or
"rational," so the concurrence deemed the methodology "arbitrary." Id.
112. Id. at 1606-07.
113. Id. at 1607.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 1607-08.
117. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1607 (emphasis added). This argument appears to
contradict the opinion of the Court, which stated that Alabama cannot "impose its
own policy choice on neighboring states." Id. at 1597. Indeed, the total cost of
the harm was roughly $4 million, and the majority opinion approved the Alabama
Supreme Court's modification of this figure.
118. Id. at 1608.
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excessive awards."" 9 Concluding that the award to Dr. Gore was
"extraordinary by historical standards," it looked for any other
statute - such as a cap on punitive damages - that might con-
strain jury discretion. 20 Again finding none, it concluded that the
$2 million punitive damages award overcame the presumption of
validity that judgments normally receive and "violate[d] the basic
guarantee of nonarbitrary governmental behavior that the Due Pro-
cess Clause provides."12'
C. BMW's Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented in BMW be-
cause "no federal guarantee [exists that] a damages award actually
be reasonable."'2 This dissent contended that the Fourteenth
Amendment assures only procedural due process, not a substantive
due process right against excessive punitive damages awards. 123
Justice Scalia opined that no precedent exists for identifying such a
substantive due process right, except for "a handful of errant federal
,,124
cases ....
Justice Scalia's dissent also criticized the majority opinion's
three-part test and its prohibition against one state punishing lawful
conduct in other states.'25 The dissent contended that the three-
part test, which relies on such generalities as reasonableness and
reprehensibility, "provides virtually no guidance" to state legisla-
tures and courts regarding "what a 'constitutionally proper' level of
punitive damages might be."'26 In addition, Justice Scalia's dis-
sent stated that the Constitution permits a court to increase the size
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1608-09.
121. Id. at 1609.
122. Id. at 1610 (emphasis in original).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1611.
125. See id. at 1612-13. On the subject of the three-part test, the dissent states
that although the majority opinion's review of punitive damages awards is uncon-
stitutional, "[o]ne might understand the Court's eagerness to enter this field ... if
it had something useful to say." Id. at 1612.
126. id. at 1612.
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of an award "on the basis of any other conduct of [a defendant]
that displays his wickedness, unlawful or not."' 7 Thus, it argued
that no authority exists for the Court's statement that an Alabama
court cannot punish a defendant for lawful actions it committed in
other states.1
2 8
2. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
agreed with the majority opinion that the court could not consider
BMW's actions in other jurisdictions when setting the punitive
damages award.'29 This dissent noted, however, that the "exces-
siveness of the award is the sole issue genuinely presented," and
that "no impermissible 'extraterritoriality' infects the judgment
before us . . . ." Regarding the review of a possibly excessive
award, Justice Ginsburg's dissent observed that the majority opinion
provides no mathematical formula or bright-line test; rather, it "has
only a vague concept of substantive due process, a 'raised eyebrow'
test ... as its ultimate guide."'' This dissent was similarly crit-
ical of the concurrence's notion of a "grossly excessive" award, and
asked rhetorically, "[w]hat is the Court's measure of too big? Not a
cap ... or a mathematical test .... Too big is, in the end,. the
amount at which five Members of the Court bridle."'3 Finally, it
noted that, unlike habeas corpus review, the Supreme Court will
attempt to create a federal standard for the review of punitive dam-
ages awards on its own, without the aid of other federal district
courts and courts of appeals.'33
Justice Ginsburg's dissent thus seemed to contend, like the sec-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1613. Again, this issue was not before the Court. See supra note 95
and accompanying text.
129. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1616 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1615.
131. Id. at 1617 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 1617 n.5.
133. See id. ("the Court will work at this business alone .... It will be the
only federal court policing the area.") (emphasis in original). The majority opin-
ion responded that even if this concern is valid, it "surely does not justify an
abdication of our responsibility to enforce constitutional protections ... ." Id. at
1604 n.41.
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ond portion of Justice Scalia's dissent, 35 that the Court's presence
in the punitive damages debate is not constructive. Indeed, in its
appendix, Justice Ginsburg's dissent listed the various caps and
reforms state legislatures have imposed upon punitive damages
awards, 3 6 and contended that state legislatures and state
courts 137 are better equipped to regulate this area. Rather than
challenge the majority opinion directly on constitutional grounds,
Justice Ginsburg's dissent questioned whether the majority
opinion's test will be effective and consistent. It concluded that the
test will not, and that, on the contrary, "[t]he Court is not well
equipped for this mission.' 31
III. BMW's IMPLICATIONS: A LANDMARK DECISION BUT A
MALLEABLE STANDARD
A. General Observations
Thus, for the first time the Supreme Court has entered "territory
traditionally within the States' domain ... . ,,3' The BMW deci-
sion represents an attempt to establish for the first time a national
standard for the review of punitive damages awards. However,
some commentators contend that the BMW standard is so vague
that "lower courts and litigators are still left without a workable
test,"' and that "the Supreme Court... left the task only half-
completed."''
Indeed, a review of the caselaw in the months since the Court
delivered the BMW decision indicates that depending on a court's
proclivities, it can utilize BMW however it wishes by choosing
which of the three factors of Justice Stevens' test to emphasize. As
the old litigator's adage goes, if you do not have the law on your
side, argue the facts. In the aftermath of the BMW decision, many
135. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
136. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1618-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also supra
notes 64-65.
137. See id. at 1617-18 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Nicholas C. Pappas, U.S. Supreme Court Overturns 'Grossly Excessive'
Punitive Damage Award, THE INDIANA LAWYER, Aug. 7, 1996, at 23.
141. Thornburgh, supra note 72, at 4.
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courts have distinguished BMW's facts from those of the case at
their bar and upheld punitive damages awards that far exceeded the
compensatory damages awarded.'1 2 In addition, many have seized
on the Court's reiteration in BMW that it would not set a mathemat-
ical formula or so-called bright-line, and used it to justify propor-
tionately large punitive damages awards.'43 Still others have inter-
preted the BMW decision and its predecessor TXO as establishing a
general bright-line "in economic injury cases [where] the damages
are significant and the injury [is] not hard to detect. . . .", Fi-
nally, some courts have focused on Justice Stevens' third factor -
what type of civil or criminal penalties exist for comparable mis-
conduct - and used it as a basis for reducing punitive damages
awards. 45
Nevertheless, a litigator who ignores the BMW decision does so
at his or her peril. Indeed, in a recent personal-injury suit in the
Eastern District of New York, the judge, when told by a defense
attorney that he had not read the BMW case, told him, "[y]ou had
better look at it. It's critical. It's the latest statement by the Su-
preme Court on constitutional limits [on punitive damage
awards]."' The judge stated that "he modified the standard puni-
tive-damage jury charge used in New York to incorporate fac-
tors... set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in [BMW] .... 147
Thus, the jury charge stated,
you may consider the assets of the defendant, what is reasonably
required to vindicate [state interests] ... above the amount of civil
142. See, e.g., Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 467 (Idaho
1996) (upholding punitive damages award almost twenty-six times that of the
compensatory damages award).
143. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801, 810 (S.D.
1996) (affirming a jury's award of $25,000 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitives):
144. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 639
(10th Cir. 1996) (reducing punitive damages award from $30 million to $6 mil-
lion).
145. See, e.g., Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 194, 202
(E.D.P.A. 1996) (reducing a $3 million punitive damages award to $300,000).
146. Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp., 94-CV-1427, 1997 WL 14785
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1997), Transcript at 2070 (on file with author).
147. Cerisse Anderson, Punitive Award Barred in Suit Over Keyboards, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 17, 1997, at 1, 4.
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damages awarded, the degree of reprehensibility ... the disparity
between the harm or potential harm.... and the difference be-
tween punitive damages and the civil awards . . . .
The jury awarded the plaintiffs $6 million in compensatory dam-
ages but no punitive damages.
B. BMW: Applying the Three Factors
1. Justice Stevens' First Factor: Degree of Reprehensibility
a. How Courts Have Applied It
Several courts have used this first factor of Justice Stevens'
three-part test to justify upholding punitive damages awards. Sev-
eral examples exist in the field of sexual harassment and discrim-
ination. In one case, the jury awarded the plaintiff general damag-
es of $1 and punitive damages of $45,000 in a suit for sexual
harassment. 49 The behavior included explicit questions about
the plaintiff's sex life and continual requests for sexual fa-
vors. 5' The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and noted that
while "none of the aggravating factors associated with particular-
ly reprehensible conduct was present in a case where repainting a
car was not disclosed ... [h]ere the jury found that the behav-
ior ... was degrading and reprehensible.''. Similarly, in a case
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 and
state sexual discrimination law,'53 a federal district court af-
firmed a verdict whose punitive damages were four times the size
of the compensatory damages. 5 4 The court concluded that "a
jury could certainly find that the [defendant]'s conduct.., was
148. Id.
149. See Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v. Hotle, 473 S.E.2d 256, 259 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 261.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 1993).
154. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396 (N.J. Dist. Ct.
1996).
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sufficiently reprehensible to merit a sizable sanction." '55
In other areas, courts have used the "reprehensibility" factor to
distinguish their cases from the BMW holding. For example, in
one case, an insurance company deceived the plaintiff into believ-
ing he would receive approximately $250,000 in lifetime
benefits.'56 In fact, the internal limits within the policy made
reaching this limit virtually impossible.'57 In addition, when the
plaintiff submitted a valid claim for reimbursement for medical
expenses, the insurance company denied it. 5 The trial court
awarded the plaintiff $3,800 for breach of contract, $120,000 in
compensatory damages, and $3.2 million in punitive damages.'59
The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed these awards, and noted
that, in contrast to the defendant in this case, the defendant in
BMW committed no affirmative acts of misconduct and made no
deliberately false statements."6 Thus, the court stated, the
reprehensibility of defendant's conduct justified such a
disproportionately large punitive damages award. 6'
b. Its Potential Impact on Common Law Toxic Tort Cases
Unlike most sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, or fraud
cases, however, toxic tort cases typically involve fact patterns in
which the defendant is often not malicious but simply careless or
ignorant. Thus, the reprehensibility factor might evolve into a
nationwide rule similar to the "actual malice" standard many
states have used for punitive damages in personal injury cases,
and serve to limit punitive damage awards. Indeed, in comparing
the TXO and BMW opinions, the distinguishing factor was that
the defendant in TXO engaged in a "pattern of fraud, trickery,
and deceit."'62 Thus, reading the two opinions side-by-side, one
155. Id. at 426.
156. See Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 458 (Idaho
1996).
157. See id. at 459, 460.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 456.
160. See id. at 468.
161. Id.
162. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
(1993).
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concludes that a court may impose a disproportionate punitive
damages award only on a defendant who acts deceitfully or repre-
hensibly. Justice Breyer's concurrence supports this interpretation.
Indeed, its analysis of Alabama's punitive damages statute crit-
icized that state's broad definitions of malice and fraud, 16
3
which provided for punitive damages for "serious kinds of mis-
representations" and "much less serious conduct . . . ."4 If the
Supreme Court or other federal or state courts expand on this no-
tion in future cases, they might argue that the Constitution per-
mits punitive damages only where serious fraud or deceit has
occurred.
In cases without evidence of deceit, malice, or wanton behav-
ior, the reprehensibility factor might constrain punitive damages
awards even in cases involving personal injury. The BMW opin-
ion does distinguish between "purely economic" harm and harm
that implicates an individual's health and safety.165 Thus, the
reprehensibility factor appears to encompass more than consider-
ation of the defendant's malice. However, one is uncertain wheth-
er unintentional environmental contamination that affects only
property rights is a "purely economic"' injury sufficiently
"reprehensible" to warrant a very large punitive damages award.
Indeed, the "actual malice" standard has proven to be a signifi-
cant hurdle for plaintiffs in state-court personal injury cases who
request punitive damages. For example, in one toxic tort case,
where common-law precedent required that a defendant act with
"'conduct characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or
fraud,""' 67 the Maryland Court of Appeals overturned the jury's
punitive damages award. 6 ' The plaintiffs had sued the producer
of an asbestos-containing insulation product and the jury awarded
the plaintiffs $6 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 mil-
lion in punitive damages. 69 However, the Maryland Court of
163. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1605 (1996).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1599.
166. Id.
167. Owens-Coming Fiberglass v. Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md. 1995)
(citations omitted).
168. Id. at 1143.
169. Id.
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Appeals reversed the trial court's holding because it found that
the defendant lacked "actual knowledge" of the product's dangers
since its belief "that exposure could be kept to safe limits was
consistent with the state of the art [technology that existed] be-
tween 1968 and 1972. " 170
In a similar case, in which the city of Baltimore sued on behalf
of municipal workers exposed to asbestos in municipal buildings,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals used the same rationale to
overturn a $2.6 million punitive damages award. 171 In that case,
the plaintiffs presented company documents and trade journal
articles "dating back to the 1940s" that addressed the potential
health risks that workplace exposure to asbestos posed. 7 1 In ad-
dition, the evidence indicated that the defendant received more
than 100 reports of asbestosis. 173 However, because the evidence
did not specifically address exposure "to in-place asbestos in
buildings," a Maryland court again held that the plaintiff did not
prove "actual malice."'174
Another possibility is that the "reprehensibility" factor might
evolve into one requiring reckless or unjustifiable behavior. State
courts which have relied on the "reckless" standard have also
reduced punitive damages awards despite evidence that a defen-
dant knew its behavior might harm a plaintiff. For example, in
another asbestos case,175 the Iowa Supreme Court vacated a $5
million punitive damages award because "[m]erely having knowl-
edge sufficient to initiate a duty to warn does not meet the higher
standard [of willful and wanton disregard] necessary to award
punitive damages."'76 The company's own studies revealed in
1965 that exposure to asbestos might cause lung problems, and a
170. Id.; see $1.5 Million Punitive Award Overturned: Maryland Court Finds
No 'Actual Malice', Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 20, 1996, at 918.
171. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
670 A.2d 986 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 994.
174. Id. at 986; see $2.6 Million Asbestos Award Overturned; City Fails to
Show Actual Malice by Maker, Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 16, 1996, at 1320.
175. Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 496
N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1993).
176. Id. at 256.
BMV v. GORE
few decades later, a worker suffering from pleural plaques and
asbestosis due to workplace exposure brought suit.'77 The 1993
jury verdict awarded him punitive damages but the Supreme
Court held that the defendant had not acted sufficiently reckless-
ly.' Similarly, a federal court in 1994 vacated a $250 million
punitive damages award against a company liable for part of the
dumping at the infamous Love Canal site.'79 While the court
acknowledged that the defendant was negligent in dumping
21,800 tons of chemicals at Love Canal between 1942 and 1953,
"they did not exhibit the degree of recklessness" justifying the
punitive damages award."' °
2. Justice Stevens' Second Factor: Requiring a Reasonable
Relationship Between Punitives and Compensatories but No
"Bright-Line" Test
a. How Courts Have Applied It
Some courts have seized on BMW's stated refusal to set forth'
"a simple mathematical formula" for reviewing the punitive dam-
age to compensatory damage ratio."8 ' For example, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a verdict in which the punitive damages were
twelve times the compensatory damages awarded.8 2 The court
noted that BMW affirmed the notion that "a mechanical ratio...
would not make good sense," and added that "[t]he highest award
of punitive damages against any one of the seven defendants was
only $22,500. The sky is not the limit, but $22,500 is not the
sky."'8 3 Another court justified its affirmance of a verdict -
whose punitive to compensatory damage award ratio was a whop-
ping 65,000 to 1 - by noting that the Supreme Court "once
177. Id. at 247.
178. Id.; see $5 Million Punitive Award Properly Vacated on Grounds of Con-
duct, Iowa High Court Says, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA), Mar. 1.9, 1993.
179. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 996
(W.D.N.Y. 1994).
180. See id.; see also Federal Court Rules Against $250 Million in Punitive
Damages for Love Canal Actions, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA), Mar. 18, 1994.
181. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1601-02 (1996).
182. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996).
183. Id. at 919-20.
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again reiterated its rejection of a. categorical approach to the
calculation of damages."1
84
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the BMW case as im-
posing a range of a one to four to a one to ten ratio."' The case
involved a claim of tortious interference with contract and pro-
spective business advantage, and the Tenth Circuit had upheld a
compensatory damages award of $269,000 and a punitive damag-
es award of $30 'million.18 6 However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the case in light of the BMW deci-
sion. The Tenth Circuit attempted to read the BMW and TXO
decisions in conjunction. The BMW decision struck down a puni-
tive damages award 500 times the size of the compensatory dam-
ages, and noted that, although the award in TXO was 526 times
the size of the compensatory damages, "[in TXO] we relied on
the difference between [the punitive damages award] and the
[potential] harm to the victim ... if the tortious plan had suc-
ceeded ... . The relevant ratio was not more than ten to
one."' 7 Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that "BMW
imposes in cases ... involving commercial litigation with sub-
stantial actual and potential damages" a "range of a one to four to
a one to ten ratio ....""' Relying on the plaintiffs' $1 million
estimate of its actual and potential loss, the Tenth Circuit reduced
the punitive damages award from $30 million to $6 million.8 9
B. Its Potential Impact on Common Law Toxic Tort Cases
Justice Stevens' "reasonable relationship" test might help a
court justify large punitive damages awards in environmental
cases involving personal injury. The opinion holds that a dispro-
portionate punitive damages award is permissible where "a partic-
ularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of eco-
184. See Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v. Hotle, 473 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996).
185. See Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634,
643 (10th Cir. 1996).
186. Id. at 635.
187. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
188. Continental Trend Resources, Inc., 101 F.3d at 643.
189. Id.
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nomic damages,"'" or where "the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value.., might have been difficult to determine. '
In addition, the BMW opinion's statements regarding actual and
potential harm might justify a punitive award that far exceeds a
plaintiff's compensatory damages.1 2 Thus, in an environmental
case where several individuals are harmed and many more might
have been if the defendant's conduct had gone unchecked, Justice
Stevens' reasonable relationship test might give a court the lee-
way to impose a large punitive damages award. In contrast, in a
case where the jury is able to quantify a plaintiff's losses and no
specter of potential harm exists, the ratio factor might serve to
limit punitive damages.
3. Justice Stevens' Third Factor: Civil or Criminal Penalties for
Comparable Misconduct
a. How Courts Have Applied It
Courts that have reduced punitive damage awards since the
BMW decision have leaned heavily on Justice Stevens' third fac-
tor: the civil or criminal penalties that exist for comparable mis-
conduct. 193 For example, in a sexual harassment and discrimina-
tion case brought under Title VII, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$203,000 in lost wages, $1.3 million in noneconomic damages,
and $3 million in punitives, but the federal district court judge
reduced the punitive damages award to $300,000.'9 This figure
represented the cap that Title VII placed on all damage awards.
In a similar fashion, a federal district court reduced a punitive
damages award in a case involving fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation. 5 The jury had awarded the plaintiff $313,593 in
190. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
191. Id.
192. Id. The Court highlights the presence of actual and potential harm in TXO,
and notes that "there is no suggestion that Dr. Gore or any other BMW purchaser
was threatened with any additional potential harm by BMW's nondisclosure
policy." Id.
193. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
194. See Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 194, 202 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
195. See Utah Foam Products Co. v. Upjohn Co., 930 F. Supp. 513 (D. Utah
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compensatory damages and $5.5 million in punitive damages.'96
The court, relying on the third prong of the BMW holding, exam-
ined the monetary penalties the state's antitrust and unfair trade
practices acts imposed.'97 Noting that "[nione of the sanctions
which could be imposed ... approach the $5.5 million punitive
damages award in this case[,]" the court reduced it to just over
$600,000.'
B. Its Potential Impact on Common Law Toxic Tort Cases
In contrast to the above-mentioned cases, Justice Stevens' third
factor should give courts leeway to uphold disproportionate puni-
tive damages awards in toxic tort cases. Indeed, the 1990's has
seen the increasing use of criminal prosecution and the imposition
of stiff civil penalties against violators of environmental laws. In
fiscal year 1994 alone, "the [EPA] brought a record 2,246 en-
forcement actions with sanctions, including 220 criminal cases,
1,596 administrative penalty actions, 403 new civil referrals to
the Department of Justice ... totaling approximately $151 mil-
lion combined for civil penalties and criminal fines . . . ."'99 In
addition, the major environmental statutes allow for staggering
fines and prison terms, and certainly provide notice that violators
will face stiff sanctions. For example, RCRA imposes a fine of
up to $25,000 per day for each violation of RCRA or a RCRA
compliance order."° In addition, an individual who knowingly
violates a RCRA provision or knowingly makes material mis-
statements or omissions to the EPA could face a fine of $50,000
per day for each violation and a two-year prison sentence.20'
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act °2 also mandates fines
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of up to $25,000 per day on the negligent violator,"3 and
$50,000 per day on the intentional violator.2" It also provides
for a prison sentence of up to six years for an intentional violator
who has a previous record of environmental infractions."' Thus,
unlike, for example, Alabama's $2,000 penalty for deceptive trade
practices, 26 environmental statutes impose severe penalties and
provide sufficient notice to impose a large punitive damages
award.
IV. CONCLUSION
In BMW, the Supreme Court has vacated a punitive damages
award for the very first time. However, BMW's unusual circum-
stances allow a court to distinguish its facts and uphold a
disproportionately large punitive damages award. In addition,
BMW's three-part test provides a court with great latitude and
does not represent a clear standard. BMW's future importance to
common-law toxic tort cases depends on which aspect of its test
the Supreme Court or other federal or state courts expand. In its
current composition, BMW's general, "raised eyebrow" test will
not lead to uniformity and consistency.
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204. Id. § 1319(c)(2).
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